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Philosophers have committed sins while studying science, it is said—philosophy of
science focused on physics to the detriment of biology, reconstructed idealizations of
scientific episodes rather than attending to historical details, and focused on theories
and concepts at the expense of experiments. Recent generations of philosophers of
science have tried to atone for these sins, and by the 1980s the exculpation was in full
swing. Marcel Weber’s Philosophy of Experimental Biology is a zenith mea culpa for
philosophy of science: it carefully describes several historical examples from
twentieth century biology to address both ‘old’ philosophical topics, like reduction-
ism, inference, and realism, and ‘new’ topics, like discovery, models, and norms.
Biology, experiments, history—at last, philosophy of science, free of sin.
The mere existence of this book is a service to the discipline. One of its strengths
is the amount of philosophical and scientific territory it covers. With the vantage of
several detailed case studies, the nine chapters serve as both accessible introductions
to core problems in philosophy of science, and as demonstrations of how these
problems can be freshly addressed by paying attention to historical details of
experimentation in biochemistry. For instance, in Chap. 4, after discussing
the ‘oxidative phosphorylation controversy’, Weber has a section called ‘Why
Biochemists Are Not Bayesians’ (p. 108). Moreover, this book is a contribution to
the re-emergence of excellent work in general philosophy of science. One often
hears that philosophical inquiry into scientific realism, methodology, conceptual
change, and explanation have lost momentum compared to philosophical inquiry
into conceptual matters in the special sciences. This book challenges such a trend.
Weber confronts a tension in the discipline of philosophy of science (and
philosophy more generally) between descriptive and normative accounts of its
subject matter. The cartoon dialogue goes like this: Positivists and Popper said
‘‘scientists should do it this way’’; Kuhn and other historically-minded philosophers
J. Stegenga (&)
Department of Philosophy, UCSD, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, CA 92093-0119, USA
e-mail: jstegenga@ucsd.edu
123
Erkenn (2009) 71:431–436
DOI 10.1007/s10670-009-9180-z
and naturalized epistemologists said ‘‘but scientists don’t actually behave that way’’;
and recently more daring philosophers respond by saying ‘‘perhaps not…but they
should!’’. Weber falls squarely in the descriptive camp. The trouble is that it is hard
to see how a philosophical methodology so committed to a descriptive approach can
be used to refine or refute normative philosophies of science; this limits the
philosophical projects to which the book can contribute.
Fiery debate has already ignited from the second chapter, on reductionism and
explanation. Weber argues: molecular biology attempts to provide reductionist
explanations, physiochemical laws are needed to undergird such explanations, and
Cummins-style functional analyses are a good way to think about explanations in
experimental biology. Critics have elsewhere responded—see for example the
December 2008 issue of Philosophy of Science, in which Weber debates with
Craver (2008) and Bogen (2008)—and so I will not discuss this chapter here;
nevertheless, the fact that it has sparked such debate speaks to the book’s
importance. This chapter can be usefully read with Chap. 8, on developmental
biology, where Weber discusses the main criticisms of a reductionist account of
genetics, in which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is given a special causal status.
With a sharp argument, Weber concludes that we should accept the claim by
developmental systems theorists that DNA is not a master molecule, but not for the
reasons that developmental systems theorists have given; rather, if we accept John
Mackie’s account of causes as INUS conditions (insufficient but necessary part of
an unnecessary but sufficient condition), then DNA must be construed as an INUS
condition, along with many other INUS conditions.
The tension between descriptive and normative accounts of science is exempli-
fied in Chap. 4, on scientific inference; this is also the weakest chapter of the book,
which is unfortunate, since it is probably of most interest to readers of Erkenntnis.
Weber criticizes previous theories of scientific inference, and gives an account of
his own. For example, he has two answers to the titular question of why biochemists
are not Bayesians: one is familiar, the other is back-to-front. The familiar criticism
is that Bayesianism requires too much subjective guess work to estimate prior
probabilities. The back-to-front criticism of Bayesianism is historical: in the case of
the oxidative phosphorylation (ox-phos) controversy, ‘‘the Bayesian approach could
be used to show that chemiosmotic theory ought to have been accepted much
earlier’’ (pp. 110–111). That is, had biochemists been Bayesians, they would have
accepted what is now considered to be the true theory (the chemiosmotic theory)
much earlier than they actually did. This is supposed to be a problem for
Bayesianism, rather than a virtue, because the biochemists did not in fact judge the
chemiosmotic theory to be true until years after the point at which Bayesianism
could have rendered a positive verdict for the chemiosmotic theory. Since the
normative Bayesian account contradicts the actual historical details of biochemistry,
the problem according to Weber is with the normative Bayesian account and not
with the science, since ‘‘the philosopher of science is well advised to take the actual
judgments of the scientific community very seriously’’ (p. 111). But Weber himself
argues that Bayesianism could have rendered a correct verdict on the hypothesis
quicker than the correct verdict was actually reached, which, one might reasonably
think, is not a vice but rather a virtue of a normative account of science. Veracity to
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the behavior of the objects of scientific study, rather than correspondence to the
behavior of scientists, should be a standard for normative accounts of science. The
converse is true for descriptive accounts of science. Weber has blurred this
distinction. One could still say: Biochemists Should be Bayesians.
Resolving the ox-phos controversy was possible only when there was a
‘‘combination of all the reconstitution experiments done in Racker’s laboratory that
provided the crucial evidence’’ (p. 108). This is one of the many interesting ideas
that Weber peppers his book with. A table lists the various modes of evidence in
favor of the chemiosmotic hypothesis and the various modes of evidence in favor of
its competitor, the ‘chemical hypothesis’ (p. 104). The evidence from the various
modes was discordant (call this discordant multimodal evidence), with several
modes favoring one hypothesis and several modes favoring the other. In the end,
strictly speaking, there was never a ‘‘combination’’ of the multimodal evidence,
since scientists, then as now, do not know how to systematically combine evidence
from different kinds of experiments. Rather, it was a consideration of evidence from
different kinds of experiments that compelled most biochemists to accept the
chemiosmotic hypothesis. Weber calls these reconstitution experiments ‘‘crucial’’,
but he notes that there was not a single crucial experiment. In an earlier discussion
of the ox-phos case, Allchin (1992) describes the eventual evidence as an
‘‘ensemble of empirical demonstrations’’ rather than crucial. Weber does not further
pursue the question of how multimodal evidence can be assessed concomitantly to
decide between competing hypotheses; he ‘‘does not think that there exist sound
methodological principles that would allow this’’ (p. 105), though he does not argue
for this. My view is that, given the ubiquity and epistemic importance of discordant
multimodal evidence in contemporary science, policy, and law, the task of
developing and justifying methodological principles to assess and amalgamate
multimodal evidence should be a priority for theoretical scientists and philosophers
of science. Nevertheless, the discussion of discordant multimodal evidence is one of
the many gems of this book, and the idea deserves greater philosophical attention. A
similar gem is placed in an endnote: the resolution of the above controversy came
only after a ‘‘plausible mechanistic explanation’’ of the victorious theory was
available (p. 305), which is yet another idea for future philosophers of science
interested in methodology to further investigate.
The normative-descriptive tension is also prominent in Chap. 3, on discovery.
Weber reviews the reasons why Reichenbach, Popper, and others held the
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification and
why they thought that philosophical analysis was only suitable for the latter.
Discovery later came to be deemed fit for philosophical inquiry because ‘‘the
concept of rationality includes more than just formal logic’’ (p. 54). Other processes
that came to be seen as part of the purview of rationality include the generation of
scientific theories and the patterns of scientific discovery. Of course, one might ask:
if such processes are inconsistent with formal logic, are they still rational? If your
answer is no, then perhaps, contra Weber, there is nothing more to the concept of
rationality than formal logic; if your answer is yes, then perhaps our concept of
rationality has become deracinated. Three recent philosophical accounts of
discovery in biology—by Kenneth Schaffner, Lindley Darden, and Frederic
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Holmes—support Weber’s claim that philosophical analysis can try to ‘‘exhibit the
rationality of the mental procedures used by scientists when generating new
theories’’ (p. 86), despite the fact that, according to Weber, these procedures are not
general across scientific disciplines.
Although a strength of the book is the amount of philosophical territory it covers,
this is also its major weakness. Much of it reads like a summary literature review,
both of the philosophy and of the science. Occasionally we are served choppy one-
paragraph histories of rich episodes in early molecular biology (see p. 159, for
example). Complicated questions like scientific realism and robustness get a small
handful of pages. Each chapter has a review and short critique of arguments from
history and philosophy of science, and then Weber’s own view as a replacement.
Some of these replacements are brilliant, while others are uncompelling. An
example of the latter comes after criticizing Bayesianism and Deborah Mayo’s
notion of severity testing: Weber suggests that biological experiments involve
controlling qualitative error to eliminate experimental artifacts. Controlled exper-
iments allow scientists to employ J. S. Mill’s ‘‘method of difference’’ (p. 120);
Weber is perfectly correct, but: (a) Bayesians can account for the method of
controlled experiments; (b) Mayo’s severity testing can account for the method of
controlled experiments; and (c) many other methodologists not discussed in the
chapter can, in their own ways, account for the method of controlled experiments.
An example of an exciting replacement comes in Chap. 7, on reference and
conceptual change, in which Weber introduces the notion of ‘‘floating reference’’—
discussing the various concepts of the gene in classical and molecular genetics, he
writes ‘‘changes in experimental methods and in theory continuously altered both
the concept’s modes of reference and its extension’’ (p. 227). Despite lacking an
essential and unchanging reference, the gene concept was extremely fruitful. Weber
modestly claims that the notion of floating reference does not generalize to the
physical science, but one wonders.
Model organisms are the subject of Chap. 6: the history of their use in laboratory
research, how we can understand what model organisms are with respect to more
traditional modes of experimentation, and the limits of possible knowledge from
experimenting on model organisms. This chapter is both interesting and frustrating.
There is not much good work by philosophers on model organisms, and Weber (here
and elsewhere) has done more than anyone to begin such an inquiry. This chapter is
full of interesting ideas; for example, Weber writes ‘‘if we look at the history of
twentieth-century biology, we find many examples of biologists who overgener-
alized findings that they obtained with a particular organism’’ (p. 156). He considers
and rejects work by Robert Kohler and others who consider model organisms to be
tools, instruments, technological artifacts, or systems of production. His reason for
doing so is curious: living organisms cannot be artifacts, simply in virtue of the fact
that they are alive. Calling living things ‘tools’ is simply a ‘‘metaphor’’, according
to Weber, and somehow it follows from the fact that they are alive that model
organisms cannot be, strictly speaking, tools. Weber has a different word for the role
that model organisms can serve: ‘‘research materials’’ (p. 186). It is hard not to see
this as a poorly-founded quibble. However, this allows Weber to introduce the
concept of ‘‘preparative experiments’’, which are not aimed at directly testing a
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hypothesis, but rather are aimed at developing research materials and knowledge of
these research materials, which will be subsequently used to test hypotheses. Weber
suggests that ‘‘a great deal of experimental work in biology is preparative’’, and so
without the notion of preparative experiment we would be missing much of
biological practice (p. 175).
The chapter on model organisms includes an insightful discussion of a contrast
between inferences based on parsimony compared with inferences based on
inductive enumeration or extrapolation (pp. 180–191). Scientists think that many
mechanisms are shared amongst all species, or at least most. But these mechanisms
have been described in only a tiny fraction of species. Thus, enumerative induction
cannot justify the belief that most species share the same mechanisms. Weber draws
on previous work by Elliot Sober, Matt Haber, and others, and suggests that an
argument from parsimony supports the assumption that mechanisms are phyloge-
netically conserved, which is a necessary assumption to extrapolate knowledge
inferred from model organisms to general knowledge of all species.
One of the more interesting sections comes at the end of the book, in Chap. 9, on
realism. Weber discusses ‘The Argument from Independent Determinations’ and
illustrates the argument with the controversial example of ‘mesosomes’ (p. 281).
Mesosomes are artifacts created by techniques of sample preparation for micros-
copy, but were once thought to be real cellular structures. The argument from
independent determinations has also gone under the name ‘robustness’ or
‘concordant multimodal evidence’, and the argument has the structure of an
inference to the best explanation or a no-miracles argument: it would be a miracle if
multiple modes of evidence confirmed x (where x is an entity, or a process, or a
constant, or a relation), and x is not true; we do not accept miracles as compelling
explanations; thus, when multiple modes of evidence confirm x, we have strong
grounds to believe that x is true. In a series of papers in the 1990s, mesosomes
served as an example for philosophers who argued for and against the veracity of
robustness arguments given the vicissitudes of the purported reality of mesosomes,
and vice versa, mesosomes served as an example for philosophers who argued for
and against the reality of mesosomes given the vicissitudes of the purported veracity
of robustness arguments.
Profound insights have been made by philosophers engaged in careful descriptive
enterprises—think of Thomas Kuhn, Hans-Jo¨rg Rheinberger, and Hasok Chang.
Weber is in good company. He describes this company throughout the book, and
especially in Chap. 5, on experimental systems, which can be usefully read together
with the fourth chapter, on scientific inference. However, let me restate my worry.
Some traditional philosophical questions are primarily descriptive, and thus a
descriptive approach to them is appropriate. Candidates in this class could include
reductionism and reference change. Other traditional philosophical questions are
primarily prescriptive, and the prescriptions are made with the force of logical
arguments, and so a descriptive approach, in which counter-prescriptions have force
derived from empirical conclusions, is less appropriate. Candidates in this class
could include arguments for and against realism, and norms of scientific inference.
Of course, this distinction between the normative and the descriptive has been
vigorously disputed, and exemplifies a tension in all of philosophy—consider
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Quine, or consider the recent ‘experimental philosophy’ movement. Not all will
agree with this distinction, but it is, nevertheless, why some chapters of Weber’s
book are uncompelling, while other chapters are insightful.
I would recommend this book to senior undergraduates, graduate students, and to
any philosopher of science interested in experimental biology. Despite several flaws
discussed above, this book achieves a fine balance between being a valuable
research manuscript and being a valuable text for undergraduate education—akin to
Ian Hacking’s (1983) Representing and Intervening. However, the price of this
book, as with most texts in the Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology series,
is high; let us hope for a paperback edition. It will serve as a valuable introduction to
problems in philosophy of science illuminated by a focus on experimental science,
and as an introduction to several important historical episodes in molecular biology
and biochemistry. Gems are strewn throughout the book, unpolished, ready to be
picked up, admired, and with hope, to be further polished so they can really shine.
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